Publications
"Moral Overfitting," forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.
When we're figuing out how to conduct first-order ethical inquiry, we should take relevant lessons from the natural sciences — and one such lesson we're presently neglecting has to do with avoiding overfitting.
Works in progress
"Non-Naturalist Moral Causation," provisionally forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 21. (Here's a draft.)
Consensus in metaethics has it that moral naturalists can account for moral causation while non-naturalists can't. But that's not right — non-naturalists with standard metaphysical commitments can have moral causation on widely-accepted difference-making accounts of causation.
"Laws as Partial Grounds," with Karen Bennett and Itamar Weinshtock Saadon, invited for submission to Reduction in Mind and Metaethics, eds. Alex Moran and Ralf Bader, Oxford University Press.
We develop an account of laws as partial grounds of their instances, in response to recent work in metaethics and metaphysics about when and whether laws feature in the grounds of particular facts.